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Abstract—According  to  neo-classical  theory,  farm 
operators’  labour  allocation  is  determined  by  the 
relative wage they can earn from their labour on and off 
the farm. At the equilibrium, time should be allocated so 
that the marginal returns from on- and off-farm work 
are  equal.  Thus,  a  move  from  coupled  to  decoupled 
payments  should  have  important  impacts  on  labour 
allocation, as it reduces the return to farm labour and 
increases the unearned income of operators. However, 
empirical studies on decoupling have shown so far only 
limited  impact  from  decoupling  and  sometimes 
contradictory  findings.  In  this  paper,  individual 
preferences and constraints are taken into account to try 
and  identify  potential  barriers  to  labour  allocation 
adjustment. Empirical analysis based on the intentions 
to adjust to decoupling of a sample of French farmers 
confirms a limited impact of the change in policy and 
calls for further investigation of the potential barriers to 
adjustment. 
Keywords—  Decoupling,  time  allocation,  farm 
operators. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
With  the  implementation  of  2003  Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, supports provided 
to  operators  shifted  towards  more  decoupled 
payments,  i.e.  payments  with  no  link  to  the  current 
production  decisions.  This  decoupling  of  support  is 
meant to reduce policy-induced production incentives 
and to make operators more responsive to economic 
signals.  Operators  are,  thus,  expected  to  make 
adjustments to their farming activities. In particular, a 
shift from coupled to decoupled payments leads to a 
change  in  the  remuneration  of  production  inputs, 
including labour. Therefore it should have an impact 
on  operators’  decisions  regarding  time  allocation  to 
on- and off-farm activities. 
According to neo-classical theory, labour allocation 
is determined by the relative wage in each job (on and 
off  farm).  The  incentive  to  allocate  labour  to 
production  to  receive  subsidies  being  reduced  with 
decoupling, operators’ labour is likely to move away 
from agriculture. Although some studies indicate that 
decoupling has led to a reduced incentive to work on 
farm  and  an  increased  appeal  for  off-farm  hours, 
empirical evidence is limited. 
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the debate 
by  investigating  operator’s  time  allocation  including 
often  unaccounted  for  individual  preferences  and 
constraints.  This  more  comprehensive  framework  of 
time  allocation  decisions  may  help  explain  why 
farmers do not always respond as expected to policy 
change.  We  investigate  whether  French  operators’ 
plans to adjust to decoupling in the context of the 2003 
CAP  reform  are  consistent  with  the  neo-classical 
model of time allocation or more strongly influenced 
by potential constraints in time allocation and specific 
job preferences. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section 
presents  the  basic  model  of  labour  allocation  and 
policy change traditionally used in the literature, while 
the following section incorporate the likely effect of 
tastes  and  time  constraints  on  time  allocation.  The 
fourth  section  describes  the  methodology  and  data 
used,  as  well  as  our  expectations.  Section  five 
provides  the  analytical  results  and  section  six 
concludes. 
II. LABOUR ALLOCATION AND DECOUPLING 
THE NEO-CLASSIC APPROACH 
According to neo-classical theory, operators’ labour 
allocation is determined by the relative wage they can 
earn  from  their  labour  on  and  off  the  farm.  At  the 
equilibrium,  time  should  be  allocated  so  that  the 
marginal  returns  from  on-  and  off-farm  work  are 
equal. If the wage they can get off their farm is lower 
than the marginal on-farm return, then operators will   2 
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be supplying all of their labour to the farm, and vice 
versa.  Thus,  a  move  from  coupled  to  decoupled 
payments  should  have  important  impacts  on  labour 
allocation,  as  it  reduces  the  level  of  earned  income 
from  farm  production  and  increases  the  unearned 
income  of  operators.  The  change  in  earned  income 
should have both a wealth and substitution effects, due 
to a reduction in farm wages and overall income that 
could  thus  make  off-farm,  on-farm  or  even  leisure 
hours  more  attractive  to different  groups  of farmers 
according to their off-farm wage opportunity and their 
preference  for  leisure.  Additionally,  the  increase  in 
unearned income should have a compensating wealth 




















Figure  1:  Time  allocation  of  operator  j  under  a  coupled 
policy 
This can be illustrated as in Figures 1 and 2 with a 
representative operator j working off farm prior to the 
policy  change.  The  operator  was  receiving  an 
unearned income R under the coupled policy, and had 
a marginally decreasing on-farm income depicted by 
the curve passing through points a, b and d (Figure 1). 
As for the off-farm income, it is represented by the 
straight  line  (fixed  hourly  wage)  passing  through 
points  b  and  c.  Under  those  circumstances,  the 
operator’s time is shared optimally between 
i
f T  hours 
off farm, 
j
o T  hours on farm, and the rest of the time 
for  leisure  (
j l ).  After  the  policy  change  (into  a 
decoupled scheme), the curve depicting the operator’s 
on-farm income flattens, as decoupled payments are 
scrapped, and the unearned income increases by the 


















Figure 2: Time allocation of operator j after a switch to a 
more decoupled policy 
Therefore, we can expect that operators’ responses to 
the  2003  CAP  depend  on  the  induced  reduction  in 
earned  on-farm  income,  the  extent  of  the 
compensating direct payment, and their potential off-
farm labour wage. 
Several  empirical  studies  did  indicate  that  a  shift 
from  coupled  to  decoupled  payments  have  led  to  a 
decrease in on-farm and an increase in off-farm labour 
supply. Indeed, while all payments (decoupled or not) 
are found to decrease operators’ off-farm hours (El-
Osta et al. [1]; Ooms and Hall [2]), coupled payments 
only increase on-farm hours, the impact of decoupled 
payments  being  insignificant (El-Osta  et  al. [3];  El-
Osta et al. [1]). It was also shown that the receipt of 
coupled  payments  is  associated  with  larger  farms 
(where  the  demand  for  labour  for  farming  is  high), 
while decoupled payments are associated with smaller 
and more diversified holdings (Goodwin et al. [4]). In 
the  specific  context  of  the  SFP  implementation, 
 
   3 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
Hennessy [5] found that, in Ireland, decoupling would 
lead to an increase in off-farm participation and hours. 
By contrast, a study of the impact of the Agenda 2000 
implementation  on  French  operators’  off-farm  time 
allocation indicated that off-farm labour participation 
should  increase  for  cereal  producers  due  to  the 
reduction  in  price  support  and  the  set-aside 
requirements, but that compensatory direct payments 
would  also  reduce  the  likelihood  of  participation, 
leading  to  only  limited  impact  on  off-farm  hours 
(Benjamin  [6]).  Similarly,  a  US  study  found  no 
significant  difference  in  the  negative  impacts  of 
coupled and decoupled payments on off-farm labour 
participation (Ahearn et al. [7]). Finally, Serra et al. 
[8] indicated that the 1996 US Farm bill had only had 
a very limited impact on off-farm labour allocation. 
III. LABOUR ALLOCATION AND DECOUPLING: 
ACCOUNTING FOR NON MONETARY ASPECTS 
As the previous section shows, empirical analyses 
have reported only small variations in operators’ time 
allocation  after  decoupling.  There  is  little  in  the 
literature so far to help understand whether those small 
changes  are  due  to  the  policy  design  itself  (i.e.  an 
overall limited change in incentives) or if other factors 
may have led operators to limit their adjustment. 
However,  there  exist  another  streams  of  research 
that  have  recognised  that  operators’  time  allocation 
may  be  affected  by  other  factors  such  as  tastes  for 
non-monetary aspects of their jobs or time constraints. 
This has been referred to as the subjective equilibrium 
theory  in  the  Agricultural  Economics  literature 
(Findeis,  [9]),  but  the  framework  has  never  been 
applied in the context of decoupling. The underlying 
idea is that individuals may share their time between 
different jobs even though the marginal wage received 
differs  across  jobs  (Heineck  and  Schwarze  [10]; 
Shishko and Rostker [11]; Smith Conway and Kimmel 
[12]). Operators’ marginal returns to on- and off-farm 
labour may not need to be equal at the equilibrium. 
The  first  argument  is  that  the  two  jobs  may  be 
heterogeneous,  that  is  to  say  that  they  may  have 
attributes that are not reflected in the wage rate that 
contribute  in  a  different  way  to  individuals’  utility 
function  (Boheim  and  Taylor  [13]).  The  second 
argument relates to the characteristics of the on- and 
off-farm  labour  markets  and  the  fact  that  working 
hours may be restricted or not perfectly flexible. For 
example,  on-farm  labour  demand  can  be  quite 
irregular  throughout  the  day,  the  week  or  the  year, 
depending on the production activities and the size of 
the  holding,  leading  operators  to  take  off-farm  job 
outside  of  the  peak  period  of  production  to  avoid 
under-employment of their time (Olfert [14], [15]). On 
the other hand, off-farm  work contracts may not be 
flexible enough to allow farmers to adjust. Therefore, 
constraints  on  time  allocation  both  on  and  off  the 
farm,  as  well  as  heterogeneity  in  preferences  across 
jobs  should  be  considered  in  analyses  of  farmers’ 
adjustment to decoupling. 
For  this  reason,  this  study  expand  the  usual 
framework  and  considers  operators’  constraints  and 
tastes  when  elucidating  the  determinants  of  time 
allocation. 
IV. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND PRIOR 
EXPECTATIONS 
French operators’ plans to adjust to decoupling are 
investigated  based  on  a  survey  of  intentions  carried 
out in 2005 in France. Respondents were asked to state 
their intentions to alter their time allocation to on- and 
off-farm  work  in  the  next  five  years  under  three 
different  policy  scenarios  with  increasing  level  of 
decoupling. First, a continuing Agenda 2000 policy is 
assumed over the next decade (benchmark scenario). 
The  second  scenario  is  the  2003  CAP  reform  as 
applied in France, that is to a historical SFP (i.e. based 
on  the  level  of  payments  received  by  the  operators 
during  the  reference  period  2000-2002)  with 
additional  coupled  payments  (for  specific  crops  and 
livestock).  The  third  scenario  is  a  hypothetical 
scenario  of  full  decoupling,  that  is  to  say 
implementing flat-rate area payments without coupled 
payments. 
Operators’ intentions collected through the survey 
are augmented by partial matching FADN records for 
the farms. The sample used contains 151 farmers. It is 
representative of the FADN whole sample, except that 
no farmers from the Alps and Pyrenees mountains are 
included. Intentions to alter time allocation on and off 
farm under each scenario remain quite stable, as less 
than  ten  percent  of  the  respondents  change  their   4 
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intentions across scenarios for both on- and off-farm 
labour  (Table  1).  Overall,  the  changes  in  intentions 
between scenarios are so small that, based on those 
results only, it is difficult to expect any strong impact 
of decoupling on labour allocation. In particular, no 
clear move towards more off-farm work is observed, 
confirming  that  a  further  analysis  of  the  impact  of 
decoupling and farmers’ incentives and opportunities 
to adjust is required. 
Table 1: Share of respondents intending to decrease, 
increase or not change the amount of time they work on- 
and off-farm (%) 
  On-farm work 
  Decrease  No change  Increase 
Agenda 2000  24  55  21 
SFP  23  49  28 
Full decoupling  28  48  24 
  Off-farm work 
  Decrease  No change  Increase 
Agenda 2000  7  77  16 
SFP  9  75  16 
Full decoupling  8  74  18 
 
In the following, we investigate the determinants of 
operators’  plans  through  two  linked  multinomial 
regressions for each of the three scenarios considered: 
one  regression  focuses  on  off  farm  allocation  plans 
and the other on on-farm allocation plans. Similarly to 
El-Osta et al. [1], to reduce endogeniety issues and to 
take into account the likely jointness of the intention to 
alter  time  allocation  on  and  off  the  farm,  variables 
denoting  the  expected  off-farm  behaviour  (i.e. 
probabilities  of  increasing  and  decreasing  off-farm 
time estimated from the off-farm labour multinomial 
regression) were included as explanatory variables of 
the regression on on-farm time allocation. The other 
explanatory  variables  range  from  social  capital 
characteristics (age, education, experience, presence of 
a  successor)  to  farm  characteristics  (farm  type, 
reliance  on  external  factors  and  subsidies),  but  also 
include  operators’  tastes  and  perceived  time 
restrictions. 
Explanatory  variables  are  chosen  to  test  the 
following expectations about the adjustment strategies 
of  French  operators,  formulated  on  the  basis  of 
sections 2 and 3. 1) Operators who were previously 
heavily supported through the Agenda 2000 coupled 
payments  will  see  their  earned  on-farm  income 
reducing as more decoupled policies are implemented, 
and they are more likely to reduce their on-farm time 
allocation. 2) Experienced off-farm workers and more 
educated operators are more likely to gain good wages 
off-farm and therefore to consider increasing their off-
farm  hours  under  more  decoupled  policies.  3) 
Operators’  taste  may  limit  adjustment  (i.e.  those 
valuing highly the non-monetary benefits of farming 
or  disliking  off-farm  work  are  less  likely  to  move 
away  from  on-farm  work).  4)  Operators  with  time 
constraints on or off-farm may find it more difficult to 
adjust (those believing it is difficult to increase off-
farm hours or that they have too much to do on the 
farm). 
V. RESULTS 
The multinomial regressions are significant at one 
percent  or  less  and  offer  good  level  of  correct 
predictions (between 60 and 80 percent). Due to space 
limitation, the tables reporting the estimation results 
are not presented here. 
First,  it  appears  that  operators’  decision  to  adjust 
their  time  allocation  is  conditioned  by  life-cycle 
patterns,  as  under  all  scenarios  older  operators  are 
more likely to decrease the time they allocate off farm 
and, under all scenarios but SFP, they are more likely 
to  decrease the  time  they  allocate  on  farm.  Second, 
under all scenarios more educated operators are more 
likely  to  decrease  the  time  they  spend  on  farm. 
However, contrary to our expectation 2), education has 
no  impact  on  off-farm  allocation.  Both  results  thus 
suggest  that  education  has  a  positive  impact  on  on-
farm  returns,  leading  more  educated  operators  to 
allocate  more  time  to  leisure.  Operators’  off-farm 
experience  has,  however,  a  complex  impact  as  the 
variable  has  no  strong  impact  on  off-farm  time 
adjustment but increases the likelihood of operators to 
decrease  or  increase  their  on-farm  time  allocation. 
This  shows  that  operators  with  previous  off-farm 
experience are more likely than others to adjust their 
time  allocation  under  all  scenarios,  possibly 
demonstrating  that  they  also  are  those  with  greater 
opportunities  to  do  so.  Third,  under  all  scenarios 
operators employing a larger number of hired workers   5 
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are more likely to increase their off-farm labour. They 
are also less likely to decrease their on-farm working 
hours under Agenda 2000 and more likely to increase 
them  under  the  two  decoupled  policies.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  employing  labour  can 
either allow operators to free time from the farm and 
work  elsewhere  or  require  them  to  spend  more 
“supervision time”  on  the  farm.  This also reflects a 
greater  dynamism  from  operators  managing  larger 
farms, as they are globally less likely to passively keep 
their time allocation the same as time passes. Fourth, 
operators for whom subsidies constitute a large share 
of their total output value are less likely to decrease 
their on-farm time allocation under Agenda 2000 only. 
Additionally,  farmers  involved  in  previously  more 
supported  production  activities  (i.e.  having  a  high 
share of crop in the total value of production) are more 
likely to increase their on-farm hours under Agenda 
2000  only.  The  combination  of  those  two  results 
confirm  our  expectation  1)  that  operators  who  are 
more likely to loose out from the policy change are 
less  likely  to  increase  their  on-farm  hours  under 
decoupled  policies.  Finally,  it  is  interesting  to  note 
also that, under all scenarios, operators whose revenue 
heavily  depends  on  subsidies  are  less  likely  to 
decrease their off-farm hours. This suggests that less 
competitive  operators  may  use  off-farm  work  to 
increase their total income while keeping their farm 
running. 
  The  results  further  confirm  that  operators’ 
preferences and constraints matter, as they are often 
significant  regressors.  First,  operators’  positive 
attitudes  towards  part-time  farming  make  them  less 
likely to increase the time they spend working off farm 
under all scenarios. This indicates that operators might 
intend to increase their off-farm time allocation out of 
necessity rather than because they are happy with their 
part-time  operator  status.  It  reinforces  the  idea  that 
operators holding an off-farm job may do so to keep 
their farm running. Second, operators valuing less the 
non-monetary benefits from farming are less likely to 
decrease the time they spend on farm. This contradicts 
our  expectation  3),  but  might  indicate  that  such 
operators  do  not  want  their  on-farm  income  to  fall. 
Third, operators stating that they are too busy on-farm 
plan  to  increase  even  further  their  on-farm  time 
allocation  under  all  scenarios.  Finally,  although  our 
expectation was that operators who feel that they are 
constrained in their ability to increase their off-farm 
hours should be less likely to increase those under all 
scenarios,  the  related  statement  seems  to  have  no 
impact on labour allocation. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Contradicting  expectations,  operators’  intentions 
regarding their labour allocation are little affected by 
the level of decoupling of the support they get. Most 
of the respondents plan the same adjustments in their 
time  allocation  under  continuing  Agenda  2000  or 
under decoupled policies. From our empirical analysis, 
variables relating to the life cycle of operators (age) or 
translating  operators’  tastes  and  constraint  in  labour 
allocation appeared to be stable predictors of decisions 
under  all  scenarios.  These  results  call  for  further 
investigations of operators’ time allocation decisions 
and opportunities to be able to better understand their 
behaviour under various policy schemes. 
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